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1Cartel Stability and Economic Integration
Abstract
This paper investigates the eﬀect of economic integration on
the ability of ﬁrms to maintain a collusive understanding about
staying out of each other’s markets. The paper distinguishes
among diﬀerent types of trade costs: ad valorem, unit, ﬁxed. It is
shown that for a suﬃcient reduction of ad valorem trade costs, a
cartel supported by collusion on either quantities or prices will be
weakened, thus integration is pro-competitive. If integration con-
sists of a reductions in unit (ﬁxed) trade costs a price setting cartel
is strengthened (unaﬀected), while a quantity setting one is weakened.
Key Words: Collusive behavior, trade liberalisation, speciﬁc tariﬀs,
market access cost
JEL: F15; L13; L12; F12
21 Introduction
Economic integration, be it regional or global, has always been accompanied
by the notion that it will trigger competition and hence that it improves
welfare. Such arguments have been raised in relation to European economic
integration, but also in connection to closer North American economic coop-
eration. Examples from this vast literature are Allen et al. (1998), Emerson
et al. (1992), Smith and Venables (1988) and Cox and Harris (1985), all of
which based their arguments both on empirical work and on rigorous for-
mal modelling. Yet, a series of papers have questioned the general validity
of the notion that integration will be pro-competitive. In particular, when
taking account of the possibility of collusive behavior among ﬁrms, Davidson
(1984), Fung (1992), Matschke (1999) and Lommerud and Sørgard (2001)
identify situations in which economic integration may be anti-competitive in
the sense that a cartel among ﬁrms from diﬀerent countries becomes more
stable when trade barriers are reduced.1 The fundamental reasoning behind
this perspective is that reduced trade costs not only make a deviation from
1Davidson (1984) and Fung (1992), but also Rotemberg and Saloner (1989), examine
settings where a quantity-setting cartel of foreign and home ﬁrms competes on the home
market, while Matschke (1999) and Lommerud and Sørgard (2001) examine symmetric
settings where there is potential interaction on both markets. Furthermore Lommerud
and Sørgard (2001) contribute to the previous literature by distinguishing between cartels
supported by collusion on prices or collusion on quantities. Recently Bond and Syropoulos
(2003) integrate several of these aspects by examining the case of multimarket collusion
and the eﬀect on the incentives of cartel members and the impact on welfare.
3the (implicit or explicit) cartel more attractive, but also reduce the cost of
punishment and hence make the severity of a punishment – when breaking
the collusive agreement – harsher. In sum, these two eﬀects may well increase
rather than decrease the stability of the cartel.
This paper augments the literature by examining the robustness of the
latter argument in relation to a diﬀerentiated modelling of trade barriers, and
hence economic integration.2 In particular, a distinction among ad valorem,
unit and ﬁxed trade costs is introduced into a setting where two ﬁrms situated
in two diﬀerent countries have formed a cartel that prohibits exports into
each other’s home markets. It is shown that a clear anti-competitive eﬀect
from economic integration is conﬁned to a reduction in unit trade costs –
and here it occurs for a cartel supported by collusion on prices but not
for a cartel supported by collusion on quantities. Integration, consisting of
reductions in ad valorem or ﬁxed trade costs, will be pro-competitive or at
least neutral independent of the mode of collusion (price- versus quantity-
setting). However, there exists a region of high ad valorem trade costs where
an initial cost reduction may increase the stability of a price setting cartel.
Yet, a pro-competitive region will be reached for a suﬃcient cut in trade
costs.
2The previous literature focuses on the case of unit trade costs. In addition to a unit
trade cost Matschke (1999) examines quotas and the impact from quota reductions on
cartel stability. Earlier Rotemberg and Saloner (1989) examined a price setting cartel and
quota regulation, in a setting with no trade costs.
4Most formalisations of trade costs group widely divergent items such as
transport costs, tariﬀs, currency risks, administrative red tape or market ac-
cess costs together under the catch-all heading (and corresponding variable)
of trade costs. On the other hand, empirical work clearly distinguishes among
individual items of overall trade costs, see for example Bernstein and Wein-
stein (2002), Baier and Bergstrand (2001), Keuschnigg and Kohler (1996),
McCallum (1995), Harrigan (1993). Since diﬀerent cost types aﬀect agent
and ﬁrm behavior in potentially diﬀerent ways, the inclusion of a distinc-
tion between diﬀerent costs in the formal modelling of economic integration
appears to be an important step, see for example Jørgensen and Schr¨ oder
(2003).
The simple distinction into ad valorem, unit and ﬁxed trade costs used
in the present paper is motivated as follows: First, ad valorem trade costs
consists of items such as tariﬀs, insurance costs, or exchange rate risks. Sec-
ond, unit trade costs could include transport costs or speciﬁc tariﬀs.3 Third,
ﬁxed costs are market access costs such as the cost of product certiﬁcation or
adjustments to local regulation, the costs of maintaining a distribution net-
work abroad, or foreign red tape in general. The Single European Act in the
late 1980s and early 1990s provides an example of a policy tackling barriers
of the ﬁxed trade cost type, whereas the early years of European integration
dealt with the removal of (mostly ad valorem) tariﬀ barriers. Similarly, the
3However, speciﬁc tariﬀs are the exception rather than the rule and almost exclusively
conﬁned to agricultural products.
5introduction of a common currency like the euro can be viewed as a reduc-
tion in ad valorem trade costs (see for example Rose (2000)). Furthermore,
trade liberalisation under the governance of the WTO mainly addresses tariﬀ
cuts. Nevertheless, global trends in reduced transport costs and cross-border
hauling fees must be viewed as reductions in unit trade costs.
The basic model used in the present paper is that of Lommerud and
Sørgard (2001), which in turn is related to Pinto (1986). Two oligopolistic
ﬁrms from two diﬀerent countries have formed an implicit or explicit cartel
that prohibits exports into each other’s home markets and where the cartel
is enforced by grim-trigger strategies.4 That means collusion is enforced by
the threat that when one party deviates from the agreement, the ﬁrms re-
vert to static noncooperative Cournot or Bertrand competition forever. Thus
while the cartel exists, both ﬁrms are monopolists on their domestic market
– which corresponds to maximised joint proﬁts for the cartel. Yet, deviating
from the collusive agreement reaps a one-oﬀ gain, which is counterbalanced
by the subsequent punishment of reverting to the noncooperative equilib-
rium. Lommerud and Sørgard’s (2001) central ﬁnding is that by distinguish-
ing between price-setting and quantity-setting cartels, it can be shown that
an anti-competitive impact of trade costs reductions occurs for a cartel sup-
4Lommerud and Sørgard (2001) also examine more advanced punishment strategies.
Furthermore, see Matschke (1999) and Lommerud and Sørgard (2001), but also Fung
(1992) and Bond and Syropoulos (2003), for reference to cases where such cartel structures
may be relevant.
6ported by collusion on prices. In this context anti-competitive means that
the range of discount factors that suﬃce to maintain the cartel is widened,
i.e. the cartel is strengthened. This ﬁnding is reproduced in the present
paper for the case of unit trade costs, but not for ad valorem or ﬁxed trade
costs. Thus, the impact of economic integration on cartel stability is shown
to depend also on the type of trade barrier that is tackled by the integration
process.
The following section introduces the formal model. Section 3 presents the
results for the diﬀerent cost types. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a homogeneous good duopoly, where ﬁrms are based in separate
countries, a and b. Production is characterised by constant returns to scale
and marginal costs are normalised to zero. Exporting to the respective foreign
market, that is, trade between a and b, is associated with ad valorem trade
cost, τ, with unit trade cost t, and ﬁxed cost f.5 The following restrictions
apply: τ < 1, to ensure a positive prices when exporting, t < pM, where
5The ﬁxed cost f is assumed to occur in each period in which trade is conducted, which
appears to be the case when maintaining a distribution network or dealing with foreign
red tape. If, however, ﬁxed costs to trade are understood as a one-oﬀ event instead, then
this would simply be the net present value of paying f over time. What matters for our
result is that these ﬁxed costs to trade are neither associated with the price of goods nor
with the quantities traded.
7pM is the price of a monopolist, and f < πM, where πM is the proﬁt of a
monopolist. Further joint and individual feasibility-of-trade restrictions on
τ, t and f are speciﬁed below. Economic integration is taken to consist of
reductions in these trade costs. The demand function – identical in both
markets – is
qi = 1 − pi ; i = a,b . (1)
In order to maximise the joint cartel proﬁt the two ﬁrms have colluded to
restrict their sales to their respective home markets. Thus in the status quo
there is no trade and both ﬁrms act as monopolists on their domestic market
(cartel phase). It is assumed that the cartel is supported by grim trigger
strategies. If one of the ﬁrms breaks the collusive agreement by deviating
and exporting into the respective foreign market (deviation phase), the cartel
collapses and ﬁrms attempt to export into each other’s markets.6 Thus, the
static noncooperative Nash outcome will be the resulting equilibrium for all
subsequent periods (punishment phase).
Proﬁt expressions πjk are derived, where j denotes the mode of competi-
tion, and k denotes the diﬀerent phases. The possible modes of competition
are competition on prices, B, or competition on quantities, C. The diﬀerent
phases are M for the cartel phase, i.e. both ﬁrms act as monopolists, D
6Due to the existence of the trade costs, home markets are somewhat sheltered such
that under Bertrand competition, the home ﬁrm, though disciplined by the threat of
imports, still services the home market alone; no actual trade takes place after the cartel
has collapsed.
8for the deviation phase, i.e. the proﬁts of the attacking ﬁrm, and P for the
punishment phase, i.e. proﬁts when the duopoly is in the noncooperative
equilibrium. It turns out to be useful to calculate proﬁts when both ad val-
orem trade costs, τ, and unit trade costs, t, are present at the same time,







































t − τt − t2
(1 − τ)2 . (6)
While the cartel is maintained (2), each ﬁrm acts as a monopolist on
its domestic market, charging the proﬁt maximising price 1
2 and realising a
quantity 1
2, which yields proﬁts of 1
4.
An attack on the foreign ﬁrm by deviating from the collusive agreement
and exporting to the foreign market is in the ﬁrst instance not counteracted,
i.e. the attacked ﬁrm is sluggish in adjusting quantities and prices on its home
market and unable to immediately launch exports in retaliation. Thus the
deviating ﬁrm still harvests proﬁts of 1
4 on its home market. When the ﬁrms
are quantity-setters, the foreign ﬁrm persists during the attack in its quantity
1
2. Thus the attacking ﬁrm faces a demand curve q = 1
2−p, which determines
the optimal export quantity qx = 1
4 − t
2(1−τ). Accordingly, the price on the
9foreign market becomes p = 1
4 + t
2(1−τ) and proﬁts for the deviating ﬁrm,
after taking account of the trade costs, become πCD = 1
4 + (1 − τ)pqx − tqx,
which simpliﬁes to the expression in (3).
When ﬁrms are price-setters instead, the deviating ﬁrm again harvests
proﬁts of 1
4 on its home market. In addition, on the foreign market the
attacker can capture total sales by marginally under-pricing the other ﬁrm.
Yet, the trade costs of exporting the quantity 1
2 at a price of 1
2 reduce the
actual proﬁts obtained as is shown in (4). Also, from (3) and (4) it follows
that the joint restriction 1 > τ + 2t must hold for the ad valorem and unit
trade costs. This condition ensures that an attack is feasible, i.e. that trade
is proﬁtable in the deviation phase.7
In the punishment phase, i.e. when ﬁrms have reverted to the static non-
cooperative equilibrium forever, both ﬁrms (attempt to) export. When ﬁrms
are competing in quantities, exports do take place. The price is determined
by the sum of domestic and imported quantities. Firms maximise proﬁts
by selling the quantity
1+ t
1−τ




3 . These quantities result in price level 1
3 + t
3(1−τ) in both
countries, and single period proﬁts are as stated in (5).
When ﬁrms are price-setters, the punishment phase does not feature any
realised exports. However, the threat of foreign exports after the cartel has
collapsed, i.e. attempted exports, forces domestic ﬁrms to price marginally
7If the condition 1 > τ + 2t is not fulﬁled, the two countries are in fact insulated from
competition, such that there is no need to form a cartel in the ﬁrst place.
10below the lowest possible import price associated with non-negative proﬁts
for the foreign ﬁrm. The foreign ﬁrm’s proﬁts from exporting are (1−τ)p(1−
p)−t(1−p), setting this expression equal to zero and solving for p determines
the price associated with zero export proﬁts as t
1−τ, which in turn is the
highest possible price the domestic ﬁrm can charge on the home market
while still avoiding any imports. The resulting proﬁts are as stated in (6).
Parallel to the above, the case of ﬁxed trade costs f can be examined.
Denoting proﬁts when there are only ﬁxed costs to trade by ˆ πjk, one can
state:
ˆ π

























− f , (10)
ˆ π
BP = f . (11)
The proﬁts while the cartel persists are, as before, the proﬁts of a monop-
olist (7). Deviating from the collusive agreement does, under the presence
of a ﬁxed trade cost, result in proﬁts (8) and (9). In the Cournot case,
the attacker maximises its proﬁts given that the attacked ﬁrm persists in
its quantity 1
2, while in the Bertrand case, the attacker can capture the en-
tire foreign market by marginally under-pricing the foreign ﬁrm. In both
instances, the attacker encounters the ﬁxed costs of exporting f. Also from
11(8) it follows that f < 1
16 must hold in order for an attack – and thus trade
– to be feasible.
After the collapse of the cartel (punishment phase), given that ﬁrms com-
pete on quantities, both ﬁrms set quantities 1
3 on the home and foreign mar-
ket respectively, the resulting price which is identical on both markets is 1
3.
However, in order to conduct the exports, there is still the ﬁxed trade cost
f.
When ﬁrms are competing on prices instead, actual exports do not mate-
rialise. Instead, the domestic ﬁrm sets it price at a level associated with zero
proﬁts for imported goods, so as to avoid any import activity. The proﬁts
from export activity are p(1−p)−f, which after setting the expression equal









2 sold by each ﬁrm on its respective
home market. Calculating the proﬁts results in the intuitively obvious con-
clusion that the proﬁts that are possible are exactly the value of the ﬁxed
costs to exports (11), i.e., if the home ﬁrm made any proﬁts above f, this
would immediately trigger export activity of the foreign ﬁrm.
3 Results
Cartel stability in this setting is an evaluation of situations where the initial
collusive agreement becomes easier or more diﬃcult to maintain. Formally,
one investigates the range of the common discount factor δ for which collusion
12will remain unchallenged. Since in all settings calculated above the proﬁt for
a cartel member, i.e. the monopolists proﬁt, is less than the proﬁt from
deviation, but larger than proﬁts in the punishment phase, there must exist
some δ∗ such that for δ < δ∗ the threat of the punishment phase becomes so
small, that a member of the cartel will abandon the collusive agreement in
favor of the short term gains in the deviation phase. Hence, an investigation
of cartel stability must examine how δ∗ reacts to changes in the various trade
costs. In particular, widening the range of δ where collusion is supported,
i.e. a reduction of δ∗, implies that the cartel is strengthened. Conversely,
widening the range of δ where the collusive agreement will be challenged by
deviation, i.e. increasing δ∗, implies that the cartel is weakened.










is fulﬁled. Solving (12) with equality after inserting the values from the above
proﬁt expressions determines δ∗.
Ad valorem trade costs
Plugging (2), (3) and (5) into (12) the critical δ∗C
τt for the case of Cournot





9(1 − τ)(1 − 2t − τ)
13 + 22t − 6τ − 14tτ − 7τ2 (13)
13How does a change in ad valorem trade cost τ aﬀect δ∗C
τt , i.e. the lowest
discount factor for which the collusive agreement is still sustainable? Diﬀer-





12(5(1 − τ)2 + 4t(1 − τ) − 4t2)
(13 + 22t − 6τ − 14tτ − 7τ2)
2 < 0 , (14)
which is always negative since 4t(1−τ) > 4t2 due to the trade feasibility
condition 1 > τ + 2t. Thus as τ decreases, δ∗C
τt increases, implying that
the range of δ where collusion is sustainable is reduced. Or put diﬀerently,
economic integration that consists of a reduction in ad valorem trade costs
reduces the stability of a cartel supported by collusion on quantities, i.e.
integration is pro-competitive.
The case of Bertrand competition is obtained when plugging (2), (4) and






2 − 2t − 3τ + τ2 (15)





(1 − τ)(1 − 4t − τ)
(2 − 2t − 3τ + τ2)
2 , (16)
which is negative, i.e. economic integration consisting of a reduction in ad
valorem trade costs is pro-competitive, as long as τ < 1 − 4t. Combination
with the trade feasibility condition yields the following condition for the
converse case. A reduction in ad valorem trade costs decreases δ∗B
τt , i.e.
14the range of δ where the collusion is sustained increases, when 1 − 4t <
τ < 1 − 2t. So in principle both the case of a pro-competitive eﬀect and
the case of an anti-competitive eﬀect of ad valorem trade cost reductions
under Bertrand competition is possible. However, since economic integration
implies reductions in trade costs, the pro-competitive region will eventually
be reached for a suﬃcient reduction in τ. On the other hand, a t > 1
4 implies
that the range of pro-competitive τ levels is empty.
Unit trade costs
Since both ad valorem and unit trade costs are present in (13) and (15), these
critical values for δ can be used directly to examine the case of unit trade
costs.8
When ﬁrms are competing in quantities, how does a change in unit trade
cost t alter δ∗C







13 + 22t − 6τ − 14tτ − 7τ2
2
< 0 , (17)
which is always negative. Namely, the lowest discount factor for which
the collusive agreement under Cournot competition is still sustainable in-
creases when unit trade costs are reduced. Thus economic integration is
pro-competitive.
When ﬁrms compete on prices the situation changes. Diﬀerentiating (15)
8Results for the unit trade costs case turn out to be (and should be) parallel to the
ﬁndings in Lommerud and Sørgard (2001).






(2 − 2t − 3τ + τ2)
2 > 0 , (18)
which is always positive. Hence, an increase in t increases δ∗B
τt , implying
that the range of parameters where the collusion is sustainable shrinks, i.e.
the cartel is weakened. Accordingly, economic integration which consists
of a reduction in unit trade costs does strengthen a cartel operating under
Bertrand competition, i.e. integration is anti-competitive.
Fixed costs to trade
Finally, consider the eﬀect of reductions in ﬁxed costs on cartel stability.
Plugging (7), (8) and (10) into (12) the critical δ∗C
f for the case of Cournot






(1 − 16f) (19)
Diﬀerentiating (19) with respect to f gives, −144
13 , which shows that the
lowest discount factor for which the collusive agreement is sustainable in-
creases with a reduction in f, hence the cartel is weakened.
For Bertrand competition the critical δ is obtained when plugging (7), (9)
and (11) into (12); it turns out to be identical to the textbook (zero transport







The intuitive conclusion is, that the increased proﬁtability from a cut in
ﬁxed trade costs f by amount y not only enters directly with value y into
the proﬁt of the attacking ﬁrm, but also enters the proﬁts in the punishment
phase with value −y. Thus the eﬀect is neutralised, and we return to the
threshold value of sustainability of collusion 1
2. This implies that under price
competition, economic integration that reduces ﬁxed trade costs has a neutral
eﬀect on cartel stability.
Discussion
Among the various results from above we will elaborate on two: ﬁrst, the
opposing impact of a unit trade cost reduction under Cournot and Bertrand
competition; and, second, the opposing eﬀects of ad valorem versus unit trade
cost reductions.
Concerning the ﬁrst point, an anti-competitive eﬀect of unit trade cost
reductions under Bertrand competition but a pro-competitive eﬀect under
Cournot competition, i.e. the ﬁnding of Lommerud and Sørgard (2001), the
following intuition applies. What happens in the case of a unit trade cost
reduction under Bertrand competition is that even though a reduction in
t makes a deviation from the collusive agreement more attractive, it also
increases the severity of the punishment. In sum, the punishment eﬀect
dominates. Under Bertrand competition in the punishment phase the trade
17costs are the only market protection left for the home ﬁrm after the cartel
is abandoned, while under Cournot competition in the punishment phase,
the strategic interaction ensures that even though reduced trade costs cause
losses on the home market, they create proﬁt gains on the foreign market
since both ﬁrms service both markets.
Consider now the ﬁnding that eﬀects from unit and ad valorem trade
cost reductions diﬀer. In particular, under Bertrand competition a suﬃcient
ad valorem trade cost reduction is pro-competitive, while any unit trade
cost reduction is anti-competitive (see (16) and (18)). A crucial diﬀerence
between these two cases is in the proﬁts during the punishment phase as given







(1−τ)2 respectively. Both expressions are positive, hence a cut in trade
cost reduces proﬁts in the punishment phase. However since t < 1−τ holds,
proﬁts in the punishment phase react less severely to reductions in ad valorem
trade costs than to reductions in unit trade costs. More intuitively, there are
two fundamental forces at work: (i) in all scenarios prices in the deviation
phase are high, while prices in the punishment phase are low; (ii) trade cost
reductions increase the deviation price from the ﬁrms perspective but reduce
the price it can maintain during the punishment phase. A unit trade costs
reduction – even though it means a price rise in the deviation phase – has a
severe cost in the punishment phase, were the trade cost is the only protection
available to the ﬁrms under Bertrand competition. On the other hand, an ad
valorem trade cost reduction adds much to the payoﬀ in the deviation phase,
18where prices are high, while it costs relatively little in the punishment phase
were – since prices are depressed anyway – a further ad valorem reduction
makes little diﬀerence. This “softer” eﬀect on the punishment prices and
proﬁts cushions the threat from export retaliation such that with ad valorem
trade cost reductions the proﬁt gain in the deviation phase can be attractive
enough to trigger an attack on the cartel.
Table 1: A reduction in trade costs is ...
Cournot Bertrand
ad valorem pro-competitive pro-(anti-)competitive
unit pro-competitive anti-competitive
ﬁxed pro-competitive neutral
Table 1 summarises the results of the paper. Previous literature – e.g.
Davidson (1984), Fung (1992) – has established various versions of anti-
competitive eﬀects, yet always focusing on the case of unit trade costs. The
work by Lommerud and Sørgard (2001) has extended the discussion by em-
phasising the role of the mode of competition (Cournot versus Bertrand), yet
still only examining the case of unit trade costs. The present paper then, con-
tributes by examining the issue of cartel stability and economic integration
for diﬀerent forms of trade costs and thus diﬀerent forms of economic integra-
tion. It is found that clear anti-competitive eﬀects from integration are in fact
less relevant or even non-existent for the case of ad valorem and ﬁxed trade
19costs. However, what the real world relevance of these three classes of trade
costs is, and more importantly what type of trade costs actual integration
policies tackle, remains a question for empirical work.
4 Conclusion
The paper investigates the eﬀect of economic integration on the ability of
an international duopoly to maintain a cartel that prohibits exports into
each other’s markets. Such a cartel can ensure monopolistic proﬁts for the
participating ﬁrms, but is under a constant threat of deviation. However, the
temptation to break the cartel is counterbalanced by the threat of reverting
to the non-cooperative equilibrium with open competition on both markets.
Since reductions in trade barriers make deviation more attractive, but can
increase the severity of a punishment at the same time, there may exist
situations in which integration has an anti-competitive eﬀect. This type of
eﬀect has, for example, been presented by Davidson (1984), Fung (1992) and
Lommerud and Sørgard (2001), and has been taken to constitute counter-
examples to the popular notion that integration will promote competition.
Based on the framework of Lommerud and Sørgard (2001) we examined
the anti-competitive eﬀect from integration in relation to diﬀerent forms of
trade costs and hence diﬀerent forms of economic integration. Within this
framework, suﬃcient reductions in ad valorem trade costs, such as tariﬀs or
exchange rate risks, reduce cartel stability. Thus integration polices such
20as forming a customs union, implementing WTO regulations or a common
currency – i.e. strategies that mainly tackle trade costs of the ad valorem
type – are pro-competitive. Reductions in ﬁxed market access costs, such
as costs associated with product certiﬁcation or the costs of maintaining
a distribution network abroad have also a weakening or neutral eﬀect on
cartel stability. Thus integration policies such as the Single European Act
will at best be pro-competitive and at worst be neutral. Finally, reduction
in unit trade costs, such as transport costs, will strengthen cartel stability
if ﬁrms are price-setters, and weaken the cartel if ﬁrms are quantity-setters.
Thus only policies that tackle unit cost trade barriers are potentially
anti-competitive. To sum up, this paper has shown that a conclusion
as to whether economic integration is pro- or anti-competitive must also
distinguish the type of trade barriers that are tackled.
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